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Negation & Acosmism
Hegel’s Acosmist Reading of Spinoza

Chapter 1. Introduction
Spinoza is a crucial point in modern philosophy: either Spinozism or no philosophy at all. 1
When one begins to philosophize, one must be a Spinozist. The soul must bathe in the ether of the
one substance in which all that one held for true is submerged.2
– G.W.F. Hegel
Hegel’s relationship to Spinoza was far from simple. He consistently praises Spinoza for the
speculative genius of his definitions and the principle that ‘all determination is negation’ and even
regards him as something like the critical point and foundation of modern philosophy. Yet, in the
Science of Logic, the foundation of his philosophical system, the number of criticisms of Spinoza is
second only to that of Kant. Even more notable is that the decisive transition from the Doctrine of
Essence to the Doctrine of Concept is portrayed as a grand refutation of Spinozism. Hegel proclaims,
“The exposition … of substance as leading to the concept is, therefore, the one and only true refutation of
Spinozism.”3 Hegel’s account of the nature of ‘the concept’, the core of his own system, comes directly
out of not just a refutation of Spinoza but the one and only true one.
Hegel’s own understanding of Spinoza, however, is distinctive. He embraces an acosmist
interpretation of Spinoza, that is, an interpretation of Spinoza according to which Spinoza denies the
existence of finite things: a denial of the world of differentiated, limited beings and types of being, a
denial of the ‘cosmos’. I will argue that this interpretation of Spinoza is best read as a critical reading,
whose goal is not primarily to reproduce the spirit of the text so much as to render key principles and
concepts in Spinozist philosophy as coherent as possible. Accordingly, Hegel’s acosmist interpretation

Hegel, 20/163-4.
20/165.
3 SL12.15. (Italics added.)
1
2

2
of Spinoza is largely motivated by a problem, I will argue, he identifies in Spinoza’s metaphysics. This
problem is what I call the problem of finitude. The problem of finitude is that Spinoza’s metaphysics
seems to entail that, even in principle, there cannot be any finite things, even though Spinoza
consistently seems to accept that finite things exist. This latter part is what makes the problem of
finitude ‘problematic’ in the first place. Though this problematic character of the problem of finitude
is initially only interpretive, I think that an acosmist interpretation of Spinoza risks introducing serious
internal difficulties into Spinozism, making it problematic for Spinoza on a second level beyond just
figuring out interpretation. Since the importance of the issues I will discuss in the rest of this thesis is
largely determined by this problem, I will devote the beginning of this introduction to explaining why
Hegel’s acosmist reading presents a serious problem for Spinozism. Then, I will proceed to an
overview of the rest of the thesis.

Why Is Acosmism a Problem?
Spinoza’s Ethics is divided into five parts. Roughly, Part I primarily discusses infinite being, and
the rest of the Ethics primarily concerns finite being. This is not universally true; finite beings are
discussed in Part I, and infinite beings are discussed in the rest of the text. Nevertheless, it is a decent
heuristic.
Each part of the Ethics builds on the last, proceeding like a cumulative series of geometrical
proofs where later results depend on the earlier ones. In Chapter 4, I will argue that the problem of
finitude arises in Part I of the Ethics and the key doctrines and concepts on which it rests.
Now, what exactly is accomplished in the rest of the Ethics? As the name suggests, after the
metaphysics there will be a Spinozist ethics, an ethics designed for finite beings like ourselves. This
ethics is deeply informed by the philosophical psychology and the epistemology Spinoza defends after
Part I: again, integral to both are finite beings like ourselves. We would like to know about our
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knowledge in addition to, say, God’s knowledge, and it is our affects which are under consideration in
the philosophical psychology. These are all supposed to ground and inform a political philosophy. In
the meantime, he provides an answer to the question of the mind-body and he proves many other
metaphysical results of great importance for finite beings, human beings especially (e.g., conatus).
Combined with his geometrical method, these diverse philosophical topics are addressed in a
rigorously connected way with a logically tight order of presentation. As a result, Spinoza is an
extremely systematic thinker, and the full systematic force and truth of his later results depends on
what happens in Part I. What would happen if, as Hegel suggests, Part I implies that Spinoza’s
metaphysical principles entail that he must be an acosmist? That is, what if Hegel has provided an
argument, based only on Spinozist principles, which concludes that it would be impossible for a finite
being to exist? For rest of this section, let us assume Hegel successfully provides such an argument.
Considered on its own, such an argument would present a serious threat to all the sections of
the Ethics which treat finite beings as if they exist, discussing their properties, relation to infinite being,
and so on. To the extent that these discussions depend on an assumption like ‘Take some finite being,
X’, even if they were merely entertaining a hypothetical, they would be entertaining a possibility which
is contradictory, according to the very principles Spinoza uses to discuss it. If Part I gives us everything
we need to conclude that there is nothing finite, indeed that there cannot be anything finite, we can
apply the same argument right after we have assumed that there is something finite, and we end up in
a contradiction.
As a result, most of what happens after Part I, or more precisely everything that involves
finitude in the Ethics, would be based on an assumption which implies a contradiction. It would in this
sense be comparable to naïve set theory or something analogous. The principles on which naïve set
theory was based allowed mathematicians to define a ‘set of all sets which do not contain themselves’.
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If this set contained itself, then there would be something in the set that does not have the property
of everything in the set: a contradiction. But if it did not contain itself, then there would be some set
which does not contain itself outside of the set of all sets that do not contain themselves: a
contradiction. Mathematicians did systematic work with naïve set theory, but ultimately the principles
they were using in creating that system were contradictory, and in traditional logic any claim (Q) can
follow from a contradiction using the explosive argument: ‘P and not-P. Thus, P. So, P or Q. Yet,
from the first claim, not-P. Therefore, Q.’ So, uncovering one is a serious threat to the value of that
system’s results; the opposite conclusion could be quickly inferred.
In the case of mathematics, the principles on which mathematics depended had to be changed;
new axiomatic systems were developed, and the results mathematicians obtained with the old system
were largely left intact because most of the work done did not require the principles which generate
the contradiction. In the case of Spinozism, the same holds. If some of Spinoza’s principles lead to
contradictions, we will have to abandon them.
There are fundamentally two options to avoid the contradiction. If Hegel’s critical reading is
correct, then a contradiction arises only once we assume the existence of finite things. There are two
options, then: make the principles compatible with finite things or never assume finite things exist.
The second option would mean embracing acosmism. On the face of it, however, that would mean
abandoning most of Spinoza’s ethics, epistemology, political philosophy (in the Ethics, at least), and
so forth because is based on a contradictory assumption.
Yet, Hegel does not perceive acosmism as problematic for Spinoza; he views it as Spinoza’s
actual philosophical position. Of course, acosmism is still in tension with the discussion of finite things
in the other parts of the Ethics, and so Hegel’s interpretation must somehow reconcile this tension.
He does so by maintaining that Spinoza regards finite things as semblances which ‘seem’ to exist but
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do not actually exist; claims about them describe what seems to be true but not what is actually true.4
In this way, the threatening character of acosmism for Spinoza’s project is diffused by distinguishing
apparent truth from actual truth and arguing that Spinoza’s account of finite things is a perfectly
systematic discussion of the former. Much could be said about this interpretation on an interpretive
level,5 but I am more concerned with the philosophical merits of this reading.
On that level, an acosmist Spinoza faces serious problems wherever he discusses finitude. One
way that Spinoza could give up his principles to avoid contradiction is not to abandon them absolutely,
but to have two localized discourses: one where he accepts all the principles that lead to acosmism
and one where he rejects some of them. In principle, this is what Hegel’s interpretation would do: it
would separate a realm of truth, in which acosmism is true, from a realm of semblance, in which some
of the (true) principles that lead to acosmism are abandoned to discuss reality as it seems to be.
The problem with this interpretation, however, is that Spinoza’s philosophy about finite things
at least in part depends on, or is justified by, the principles in Part I of the Ethics which are supposed
to create the problem of finitude, along with further results which are obtained using these principles.6
In other words, Spinoza does not separate these discourses; he continues appealing to propositions in
Part I which use presuppositions he would have to reject to allow finite things to exist. Since those
principles are still in use, at varying degrees of mediation, in his ethics, political philosophy,
epistemology, and the like in the Ethics, they are by no means abstracted from the realm of seeming;
they are still quite present and operative in it.

Hegel, SL21.85.
See Spinoza, E1P15s, where he seems to attribute finitude (in matter) to the imagination, not the intellect or reality;
attention to the use of ‘imagination’ in Ep12 sometimes suggests a similar idea. For some evidence against the acosmist
interpretation, evidence which I agree rules against it, see Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 79-83; “Omnis determinatio est
negatio,” 187-9.
6 For example, E1P21 alone, which I discuss at length in Chapter 4, is used to justify E1P28, E2P11, E2P30, E4P4, and
E5P40, all of which primarily concern finite things. As you can imagine, the citations multiply as we consider the use of
each of these propositions.
4
5
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That fact would mean that the contradiction they entail (finite things exist and do not exist)
would still be latent in this sphere of semblances, and Spinoza is not a philosopher ready to accept a
contradiction. The only way the contradiction in Spinoza’s discussion of finite things could be kept at
bay would be to insist that we must not make the argument that results in acosmism. Once this is
admitted, the justifying force of Spinoza’s arguments is lost; they can no longer be viewed as deductive
proofs from a true metaphysics to further consequences which the reader must accept. At best, they
would amount to an insightful description of reality whose geometric presentation is mostly a stylistic
choice because the deductive reasoning used in it could lead to any conclusion if we just choose to
make the right arguments on Spinozist principles, arguments equally sound as those Spinoza does
make. The decision to continue using the relevant doctrines of Part I would be little more than a
contingent choice, a choice which could simply be refused to obtain a more consistent discourse. It
seems to me, then, that the option of separating the finite and infinite into two separate discourses or
realms, like appearance and reality, semblance and actuality, or the like, is untenable: not only would
Spinoza not choose to just discuss a contradictory realm, any arguments he might make about it would
hardly have any binding force to them.
Because the Ethics’ discussion of finitude depends on its discussion of the infinite in this way,
we will have to keep the discourses about the two unified. Our other option, then, is that we reject
enough of the assumptions which generate the problem of finitude to avoid the problem in the first
place. My arguments in this thesis will suggest that this would mean making substantial revisions to
Spinoza’s views on negation and being in particular, revisions which would move Spinoza closer to
Hegel. Nevertheless, my aim here is not to pursue these lines of revision but instead to reconstruct
the problem, building up to acosmism.

7

Summary & Overview
Concisely put, my thesis is this: Spinoza’s views on negation are coupled with a view of being
which, although Hegel misunderstands it to an extent, does make it impossible for there to be finite
things after Spinoza’s monism is introduced. Chapters 2 through 5 are dedicated to defending and
giving meaning to this claim, but I will first summarize the whole so that it can be grasped, as it were,
“in one glance”7 more easily.
Because Hegel often discusses acosmism in connection with negation, even though I will argue
the question primarily has to do with being and being-there (i.e., the kind of immediacy which is both
being and nonbeing), I will begin by providing an account of Spinoza and Hegel’s views on negation
so that the requisite translation can be made in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. I argue Spinozist negation is
strictly transcendent, whereas Hegel’s basic definition of negation is an immanent one. That is, Spinoza
locates something’s negation outside or beyond its being, while Hegel holds that the basic concept of
negation is within or internal to its being. While Spinoza’s views of negation are largely introduced in
definitions and clarifying remarks, Hegel’s are justified by the initial arguments of the Science of Logic. I
will provide my own account of these arguments in some detail in part because I want to show how
the issues at stake are not just matters of defining things differently, disagreeing on basic principles,
or anything of the sort and in part because Hegel’s underlying views on being, nothing, and beingthere are important through the entire thesis.
Indeed, Spinoza’s views on negation reveal a more fundamental understanding of being: one
unlike Hegel’s, in that Spinoza maintains a strict separation of being and nonbeing. Hegel identifies
this difference and interprets Spinoza’s strict separation of a thing’s being from its nonbeing as
extirpating nonbeing from ontology altogether. In this, he holds that Spinozism involves an ‘Eleatic’
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Spinoza, E2P40s2.
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conception of being, that is, an understanding of being which holds that there is a strict separation of
being and nonbeing and that any introduction of nonbeing into ontology involves an error. I argue
against Hegel’s importation of this second part of the Eleatics into Spinoza; Spinoza does grant a place
for nonbeing within a fully adequate ontology, understood as the study of being (not being itself). For
Spinoza, nonbeing and negation are ‘beings of reason’, rational constructs without direct metaphysical
correlates which can be used indirectly, but perfectly adequately, to speak of being. So, there is no
‘negation’ in reality, but negation describes something about the relationships and properties of real
beings indirectly. This indirect condition requires that Spinoza find a way to ground what nonbeing
and negation express in positive being.
This requirement is, I believe, at the heart of Hegel’s acosmist reading of Spinoza, that is, his
reading of Spinoza according to which Spinoza denies the existence of finite things. His acosmist
reading of Spinoza could be seen as claiming, centrally, that Spinoza cannot provide a ground for
negation or nonbeing. In order to understand why finding such a ground becomes so problematic, I
first give an account of basic features of Spinoza’s metaphysics, beyond what was required for the
discussion of negation. In this vein, I introduce the Spinozist ontological framework of substance,
attribute, and mode, and I reconstruct Spinoza’s monism. I identify three distinct stages in the Ethics
of the development of his monism, each establishing a distinct aspect of Spinoza’s monistic being: he
proves that substance must exist, then that substance must exist as God, and finally that this divine
substance is nature. In the process, I highlight how elements of his ontological framework and proof
of monism gradually introduce factors that finally result in the problem of finitude.
More precisely, the combination of Spinoza’s monism and his underlying views of negation
and being entail the problem of finitude. I argue that this problem of finitude appears most explicitly
in E1P21 and E1P22, which I will argue acknowledge the central thrust of the problem: that the
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monistic being would have to be itself and not be itself at once to have finite being immanent to itself.
Together, these two propositions imply that no mode that follows directly from God or an infinite
mode can be finite. In making the case that there is a (prima facie) problem of finitude in Spinoza, I
heavily use Yitzhak Melamed’s reconstruction of E1P21, but in the process I argue against one of his
interpretive interjections, where he suggests that Spinoza invokes a strong ‘same cause, same effect’
principle. Instead, I argue, Spinoza’s argument rests on his own transcendent view of negation and his
strict separation of being and nonbeing, coupled with the immediate unity God’s being (and all it
contains) has with itself. The result is that these propositions end up being motivated by the very same
considerations that create the problem of finitude.
Hegel never carefully draws the argument out of Spinoza’s texts in introducing the problem
of finitude, but I argue that he does correctly identify the problem in a key passage on Spinoza. He
argues that God must always contain any proposed, possible reality, or else the absolutely infinite
would be rendered finite. However, because Spinoza views negation as inherently transcendent, the
negation which finitude implies would divide the immediate unity of substantial being which contains
the finite’s reality. This division would split the unity of substance’s being and everything it contains
into a diversity, into the difference between some reality and its negation. Substantial being is itself in
this reality it contains, but it is not itself insofar as its being is that negation which it is not; substance
would be and not be at once, and it would be its own negation. The finite would thus require rejecting
the strict separation of being and nonbeing and the transcendent view of negation Spinoza endorses.
So, this kind of division is impossible within his system; according to Hegel, uniting the finite with the
infinite means submerging it into a unity without real difference.
So, on this Hegelian reading, Spinoza must either give up some of his principles or be an
acosmist. Spinoza does attempt a solution to the problem of finitude, which involves mediate infinite
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modes that produce finite modes. Where he introduces this terminology, however, Spinoza does not
tell us how these mediating modes can introduce finitude, and I try to fill in the gaps.
Specifically, Spinoza’s proof for E1P21 and E1P22 relies on an assumption of finitude. This
assumption is stronger than the assumption that there is merely a multiplicity of distinct modes, and
Spinoza’s prohibition of being-there would not apply to two distinct modes. Since only infinite modes
follow directly from God and only an infinite mode can follow directly from an infinite mode, the
only option left to him to introduce finite modes comes indirectly, by the mediation of two or more
infinite modes. I will argue this mediation occurs by an implicit contrariety they have with one another
in certain respects; that is, the positive nature of certain modes has a function of excluding whatever
is incompatible with them, so that they cannot inhere in a common subject of predication. This
inability to exist as one and the same unit allows infinite modes to exclude one another in various
respects, which renders possible modes insofar as they are excluded by other modes (i.e., finite modes).
This solution, however, does not avoid the underlying problem that the problem of finitude
identifies. Since Spinoza argued that “whatever is, is in God”, no reality could be beyond God’s infinite
being. So, to the extent that finite modes have some positive being which is beyond the positive being
of whatever is excluded from them, both sides of this transcendence must be contained immediately
in the being of God. The problem is, then, that God’s being (as present in one mode), which is
immediately unified and indivisible, will have to transcend or be immediately distinct from God’s own
being (as present in another mode). This immediate unity of two immediacies which are immediately
distinct is precisely the Hegelian concept of being-there, and the unification of being and nonbeing it
involves is something Spinoza explicitly rejected. The result is that substance is the negation of itself
and that being-there is integral to its being: as expected, because Spinoza tries to ground finite things,
he must give up some of the presuppositions which frame the problem of finitude and his thought in
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general. I conclude, then, by siding with Hegel’s critical acosmist reading of Spinoza, though the
‘dialectical twist’, if you like, is that Hegel did not discuss the moment Spinoza renounced some of his
most anti-Hegelian principles in order to avoid acosmism and solve the problem of finitude, the
moment Spinoza became most Hegelian.
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Chapter 2. Foundations in Negation
Hegel credits Spinoza with the doctrine “omnis determinatio est negatio” (“all determination is
negation”); anything with any determinacy whatsoever has that determinacy only so long as there is a
kind of nonbeing (a negation) involved with its being (its reality). Since Spinoza’s mature and greatest
work, the Ethics, is most explicit on negation, I will begin by examining Hegel and Spinoza’s respective
views on negation, as Spinoza’s understanding of omnis determinatio est negatio is regarded by Hegel as a
major source of his acosmism and monism.8 We find not only a difference in their views but that their
views on the basic nature of negation are almost perfect inverses of one another. I will present both of
their views as they present them. Spinoza’s views of negation are largely established in definitions and
clarifying remarks, and from these various sources I argue negation is transcendent in Spinoza; negation
is always contained in some possible being beyond something’s being. Negation will introduce us to
Spinoza’s views on being, which are discussed further in Chapter 3.
Hegel’s views, by contrast, are justified by the initial arguments of the Science of Logic which
begins with pure being, and I will go through these in some detail for several reasons. First, I will
explicitly discuss the relationship between Hegel and Spinoza on being and nothing in the next
chapter, and so Hegel’s views on this topic will be relevant there. Second, the logic of being, nonbeing,
and the ways being and nonbeing can be united or separated is the basic source of the acosmist
concern in Spinoza. Third, somewhat more tangentially, since Hegel’s view is arguably less intuitive, I
think it is important that we see why he thinks he has demonstrated that his view is correct against
Spinoza, so that we do not think the difference between them is simply a dispute on first principles.
Nevertheless, what is his view? I will argue that Hegel’s basic understanding of negation is an immanent
one, on which negation is within something’s being. The discussion of negation in Spinoza will serve

8
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to introduce us to Spinoza’s views on being, discussed further in Chapter 3, and our discussion of Hegel
in this chapter will cover his views on being for this later discussion as well.

Transcendent Negation in Spinoza
Whereas Hegel is known for being a philosopher of negativity, Spinoza is known for quite the
opposite. As Deleuze says, “[t]he philosophy of Spinoza is a philosophy of pure affirmation.
Affirmation is the speculative principle on which the whole Ethics depends.”9 This fact is evident from
the very beginning of the Ethics. The very first sentence of the text is the definition of a “cause of
itself” (causa sui), as what cannot be conceived except as existing. 10 The very first thought Spinoza asks
us to think in the Ethics is the thought of something which, just in being conceived, cannot be denied
or negated: its positive being is affirmed by its very nature.
Even so, alongside this theme of affirmation, there is a concurrent theme of negation which
runs throughout Spinoza’s corpus. The very next definition in the Ethics defines “finitude”. Again,
later in the explication of the definition of God, Spinoza declares that “if something is absolutely
infinite [(as God is by definition)], whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its
essence.”11 Even in the opening definitions of the Ethics, negation seems to be playing an important
role in Spinoza’s ontology. But what is this role? Coupled with other remarks, we will see that the
definition of finitude is the definition of something with a negation, so that the meaning of negation
can be inferred from this definition. We begin, therefore, with finitude.
“That thing is said to be finite in its own kind which can be limited by something else of the
same nature.”12 As is often the case in Spinoza’s definitions, there are subtleties in this definition I

Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression, 51.
Spinoza, E1D1.
11 E1D6e.
12 E1D2.
9

10
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would like to point out since they all inform what counts as a ‘negation’ of something else. First,
Spinoza says “can be limited” (terminari potest), not ‘is limited’. So, in his explanation, Spinoza does not
say that a body is finite because it is limited by another body, but only because it can be. It is sufficient
to know that it is possible for there to be space with a volume of 30 cubic units to know that space
with a volume of just 10 is finite; there is some possible space from which it is limited. This brings us
to the second point. Spinoza says that the finite is limited by something “of the same nature”. This is the
point of saying “a body is not limited by a thought nor a thought by a body”13 in his example. It makes
sense to say a thought is finite because the ‘thinking’ it contains is not all the mental reality there can
be, and likewise it makes sense to say that an extended thing is finite because it does not include all
the extended reality there can be. But to say that this extended thing is, as an extended thing, finite
because it is not a thought would not be quite right. No matter how much reality is taken into my idea
of something, that idea will never exceed or include the extension of a body: likewise for extension
exceeding an idea. Third, this limitation is limitation “by something else” (alia). This is decisive. Limitation
always stems from something else, and we find out in the Short Treatise that, beyond that, it cannot be
based in the positive being of the finite thing at all: “[t]o say that the nature of the thing required such
limitation and that the thing therefore could not be otherwise is no reply: for the nature of a thing can
require nothing unless it exists.”14 Only insofar as the nature of the thing exists, insofar as its being is
present, can it require anything. The being of the finite thing cannot require the limiting term; this
limiting term comes entirely and strictly from the outside. That is, limitation is necessarily transcendent,
found in the reality of some other possible being outside or beyond the being of the finite thing.
I will argue that this ‘limiting term’ is the negation of the finite thing, and so it is worth asking
what this ‘limitation’ involves. As these examples show, limitation cannot be conceived as an action
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of one thing on another. A finite region of space was ‘limited’ simply because there could be space
outside of it, and it is ‘limited by’ that possible space. Indeed, it seems that terminare (‘to limit’) keeps
its close connection to terminus (‘end, boundary’); something is limited by whatever is ‘beyond the
boundary’ beyond which its own being ‘has ended’ and another’s has begun. But Spinoza himself
provides a gloss on his own definition later in the text; “being finite is really, in part, a negation, and
being infinite is an absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature.”15 The infinite, which “cannot
be limited by something of the same nature”, is pure affirmation. The finite is partial negation. The
difference between the negation and no negation, then, is located in the potential limit found in
something else of the same nature. The ‘negation’ introduced when we come to the finite must,
therefore, be located in this introduced limiting term, the other possible being found beyond the finite
thing’s own affirmative being. For Spinoza, then, something’s negation is found beyond its being in that
possible being which it is limited from. I will describe this view as a transcendent view of negation: every
negation is some possible being beyond the being of something finite. In reference to that finite thing,
this possible being is its ‘negation’.
What counts as a thing’s negation, then, will inherit the properties of the limiting term. At least
as far as the definition of negation is concerned, negations are possibilities which may or may not be
actual. Likewise, these possibilities are always outside, beyond, or external to the being of the finite thing
we are considering. Finally, negations must have something in common with what they negate.16
Here, the Spinozist understanding of omnis determinatio est negatio is most clearly introduced into
the Ethics, though Letter 50’s “determinatio negatio est” is the most explicit source of Hegel’s phrase.17
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Anything finite must have some possibility beyond its being, in virtue of which it is limited. If the
positive being of something cannot require its negation, does the fact that something is a negation
penetrate into its positive being? In other words, is something’s not being something else something
inherent in its being? The answer for Spinoza is certainly not; “I cannot sufficiently wonder at the
subtlety of mind of those who have sought, not without great harm to truth, something that is between
being and nothing.”18 Any such intermediary or synthesis between being and nothing (nonbeing) must
be rejected; negation applies only when we are thinking of something’s negation transcending
something, one positive reality standing apart from some other positive reality in some way. The
formula behind Spinozist negation could thus be put like this: insofar as something is, it is, and insofar
as it is not, it is not. There is nothing in the middle, and there is no way to be both. Already, then, we
find Spinoza with a distinctive understanding of being much in line with Deleuze’s claim that Spinoza’s
philosophy is a “philosophy of pure affirmation”.
I will discuss Spinoza’s views on being in more depth in Chapter 3. For now, it suffices to
think about how this illuminates negation. Extended things are the easiest way to illustrate the
relationship between being and nonbeing as they are used in Spinozist negation. A rock, for example,
occupies a definite region of space in which it is, and outside of that space it is not. Now, that space
outside of the rock has being just as well as the region the rock occupies does; if you do not want to
grant that space itself is real, it is at least the region of some possible (or actual) air, objects, locus of
physical properties, and so forth. But the being of this outside region is beyond or outside of the being
of the rock. It is, to that extent, the rock’s negation, meanwhile the region the rock occupies purely
affirms the rock’s being, without an admixture of negation.
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Immanent Negation in Hegel
As Robert Stern argues, Hegel’s own tendency to associate himself with Spinoza using omnis
determinatio est negatio has led many interpreters to miss the key differences between the Spinozist and
Hegelian understandings of the doctrine.19 These key differences are largely informed, as I will discuss
further in Chapter 5, by Hegel’s own appreciation of Spinoza’s transcendent view of negation and the
views of being that underlie it. The fundamental break with Spinoza, for Hegel at least, lies not so
much in his formula for negation itself; though space prevents me from pursuing it here, I think Hegel
does accept transcendent negation as a derivative concept of negation from his own. To the contrary,
the fundamental break with Spinoza happens in the first chapter of the Logic on being. Specifically, in
the transition from becoming to being-there especially, Hegel argues against the strict separation of
being and nonbeing that Spinoza accepts.
In order to prepare for this discussion of being, which will take place to an extent here and
further in Chapter 3, I will provide a detailed account of the opening sections of Hegel’s Logic, running
from pure being to the first form of negation. The main functional role of providing this detailed
account, besides just examining the strength of Hegel’s arguments, is that the details of his account of
the relation between being and nonbeing will be important later, and these details are articulated and
justified in this part of the Logic. So, my account will serve as background for those later discussions.

Being, Nothing, Becoming
Hegel complains that “[t]he whole Spinozist philosophy is contained in these definitions; but
they are universal determinations and, on the whole, formal. What is defective is that he begins with
definitions.”20 Spinoza ought not merely to set down definitions as given concepts (of finitude, of
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negation, etc.), but he ought to have somehow derived these concepts. To avoid all “assurances without
scientific validity”21 in articulating basic logical and ontological categories, Hegel cannot assume
anything at the beginning which could in any way be denied or avoided. Philosophy must begin
absolutely, that is, without making itself relative to concepts, axioms, definitions, principles, and the like
which can be denied, thought in a different way, or simply called into doubt because they rest on
distinctions and concepts whose validity remains ungrounded. To begin philosophy absolutely, one
must give up every determinate presupposition; logic demands “total presuppositionlessness.”22 It must
begin with something totally indeterminate which presupposes no prior mediation: pure being,23 pure
immediacy as such, the bare ‘that’, ‘this’, or ‘is’ itself, which is an aspect of any act of thinking and in
anything which ‘is’ or can ‘be’ at all.
Pure being is not a being. It is immediately itself, but it is not related to itself, insofar as this
relation would introduce additional conceptual complexity to it that we cannot presuppose. Pure being
has no relation whatsoever. We cannot presuppose that it is ‘being that is not…’ because this extra
clause would amount to an additional presupposition, introducing extra content or specificity than
could be minimally presupposed. Pure being can be described as the ‘indeterminate immediate’,
though this is not so much a definition as an external description of pure being. Instead, its perfect
expression is an incomplete sentence: “Being, pure being – without further determination.”24
The entire categorial apparatus developed in the Logic is supposed to be derived from pure
being alone. Hegel characterizes the kind of derivation at issue here as an “immanent deduction,”25 which
begins with one category (e.g., pure being) and, using only what it is and contains, proves that it ‘cannot be
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itself without…’, to put it generally.26 An examination of this surplus (whatever is in the ‘…’) then
ensues, resulting in a systematically integrated chain of categories that comprises the Logic.
At the beginning, all we have to make a transition to the next link in this chain is pure being.
So how is this done? Pure being has no difference within it, and it is not (yet anyway) different from
anything else. It is not a being, has no quality, and is just a totally empty ‘is’. As such an indeterminate
emptiness, “[t]here is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting.”27 Pure being has
no particular significance at all. It is rather a pure absence: pure nothing.
The transition from pure being to nothing is difficult to state. Often, certain formulations of
this argument are more persuasive than others, though the basic idea is the same: being is so lacking
in any determinacy or determinability that it is not anything at all, that is, nothing. Formulations aside,
as it is stated in the text of the Logic, the transition is missing a step or a couple steps. Hegel directly
moves from the observation that pure being is “pure indeterminacy and emptiness” to the fact that
there is nothing in it, that it is nothing. If we merely read this directly, the problem with this
observation is that it seems totally external.28 The “emptiness” of pure being seems to be introduced
as if it is new and derived, but empty of what? Where does this notion of emptiness, if it differs from
being at all, even come from? This question can only be answered using pure being, or else something
new would be introduced into the argument externally, violating the immanence of the derivation.
The argument in the Encyclopedia does not offer us an explanation here, since there Hegel seems to use
the external idea that pure being is an “abstraction” in order to move to nothing.29
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If we want to read this charitably, then, the interpretive question should not stop at objecting
to this introduction of emptiness but rather at explaining what Hegel must mean by emptiness. My answer
to this question agrees substantially with Richard Dien Winfield’s interpretation of the transition from
being to nothing, which emphasizes the fact that we must appeal to pure being alone in making the
transition into nothing.30 Since we have only being to work with, Winfield argues, nothing cannot be
anything other than pure being. Yet, precisely because pure being has no specifiable content and is
not related to itself, nothing cannot be connected to or differentiated from being on the basis of
anything: it falls outside of it altogether.
In substantial agreement with Winfield, I would reconstruct Hegel’s line of thought as follows.
Being simply is; that is all there is to it. But being is, that is, it is the being that being is. This just
consists in thinking one and the same immediacy, the only thought we have at our disposal. But now
a twist occurs. Being asserts itself (‘is’ itself), or I think being. Then, the being that being is asserts
itself (or ‘is’ itself), or I think the being that being is. But when I turn to this immediacy ‘the being that
being is’, the immediacy of ‘being’ pure and simple that I began with has vanished. That is, that
immediacy is no longer, and a new one has asserted itself in its place: we begin with this, and then we
think the very same this, but ‘this’ and ‘this’ still stand apart from each other as distinct immediacies.
This second immediacy, although it just is the being that being is, is just as much the vanishedness of
pure being: where this one is, this one is not. This immediacy which asserts itself as the absence of pure
being is pure nothing. This argument only requires thinking through pure being’s own immediacy.
The emptiness of being, then, should be understood as nothing other than ‘the being that
being is’, which you might also think of as the ‘immediacy of immediacy’ or the ‘this this’ of ‘this’. Some
evidence that this is what Hegel was thinking is that Hegel emphasizes that being “‘has passed over’,
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not passes over”31 and that being “immediately vanishes into nothing.”32 One and the same immediacy
which being is, just in being at all, has already vanished into something immediately distinct from the
being we started with. This brings us to the second category in the Logic.
“Nothing, pure nothing; it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, complete absence of
determination and content, lack of all distinction within.”33 The only difference between being and
nothing is that, whenever being is thought, nothing is not, and whenever nothing is thought, being is
not. But contained in the thought of neither being nor nothing is the thought of ‘not being its
counterpart’. Or, insofar as one is, the other is not. Following Stephen Houlgate, I call this an immediate
distinction,34 the difference between ‘this’ and ‘this’, each having its own immediacy standing outside
the other. The structure of being and nothing’s immediate distinction has a striking similarity to the
Spinozist formula for negation: insofar as something is, it is, and insofar as it is not, it is not.
But on all accounts, pure nothing has the same logical characteristics as being. Indeed, since
nothing is, on my account (and Winfield’s),35 ‘the being that being is’, it literally is being. That is, the
two are one and the same immediacy. Nothing is, or nothing is itself simply an indeterminate
immediacy, and this immediacy is just pure being. “Nothing is therefore the same determination or
rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as what pure being is.”36
Hegel thus declares, “Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same.”37 By the immanent logic of
being and nothing, each propels itself into the other; being passes over into nothing, nothing into
being. One is present (being, nothing), but the other appears because of it (nothing, being). With that
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appearance, the original term has vanished; all we have is this, whatever immediacy is at hand. The
other term vanishes as a term which stands outside the one at hand.
Now, we have the vanishing of each into its opposite. Conceiving of ‘pure being’ or ‘pure
nothing’ on their own without this mutual vanishing can only be regarded as an abstraction from what
these categories involve. What they involve is this mutual vanishing: neither can be itself without its
counterpart. Because they have lost their self-sufficiency in this way, they are moments (in Hegel’s
vocabulary), whose subsistence can only be located in a broader context, process, or structure. The
two terms sublate themselves in showing how they reduce themselves to moments by their own immanent
logic. The truth we are left with is just this movement of being into nothing and nothing into being:
“becoming, a movement in which the two are [immediately] distinguished, but by a distinction which
has just as much immediately dissolved itself.”38
This last clause already indicates the development that will push us beyond becoming. Pure
being and pure nothing are supposed to be immediacies, totally isolated unto themselves. But this is
precisely what they are not insofar as they are grasped as moments of becoming. Each is bound up with the other
in a way that immediately unites them in ‘this’ becoming. As a result, being and nothing are explicitly joined
in one unity with the term they are supposed to stand altogether apart from. Their immediate
distinction has collapsed in this respect, but it was that immediate distinction which let each ‘vanish’
into the other. Vanishing itself is no longer possible; what we are left with is an immediate unity of
being-and-nothing. As Hegel puts it, “Their vanishing is therefore the vanishing of becoming, or the
vanishing of the vanishing itself. Becoming is a ceaseless unrest that collapses into a quiescent result.”39
This ‘quiescent result’ that is being-and-nothing is what Hegel calls “being-there”40 (Dasein).
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Being-there & Negation
This is where the fundamental break with Spinoza lies. Spinoza’s view of being and nothing
maintains a strict separation of the two, and this separation is expressed in his views on negation,
where there can never be an immediate unity between something’s nonbeing and its being. In Hegel,
being-there is precisely the immediate unity of the two, and Hegel takes himself to have conducted an
a priori derivation of the truth of this category. If his argument is right, this concept is not just a fiction
but is involved in thinking anything which can ‘be’ at all. I will explore this general difference between
Hegel and Spinoza on being in Chapter 3, but let us first consider the explicit contrast with Hegel’s
views on negation, found in the chapter on being-there.
“Being-there proceeds from becoming. It is the simple unity of being and nothing. On account
of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate.”41 Being-there is the immediate unity of being and
nothing, and so being-there initially is, or is available as ‘being’. Being-there is therefore initially ‘the
being that is being and nothing’. The nonbeing in being-there is called determinacy, and so being-there
is ‘determinate being’, unlike pure being. But being-there is an immediacy which is being and nothing.
In just immediately being itself, being-there just as much is as it is not. Thus, being-there is immediately
also ‘the nonbeing that is being and nothing’, which Hegel calls quality.42
Negation first appears with quality. How is quality distinguished from being-there? Quality is,
as it were, the being-there of being-there: it is not just a unity of being and nonbeing, but it is a unity
of being and nonbeing whose given content is already a unity of being and nonbeing. Quality is
nonbeing that is being and nothing, and so it is nonbeing that is being-there. But being-there is primarily
being, and so quality is a unity of being and nonbeing at a second order: it is the nonbeing that is being-
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there. This yields two new moments of quality: negation and reality. Negation is quality insofar as it is
the determinacy, or quality insofar as it is nonbeing. Reality is quality insofar as it is being.43
We are very far from Spinoza. Unsurprisingly, because Hegel’s view of negation follows from
the general structure of being-there, negation is immanent to something’s being insofar as it is there at
all. To recall our example of the rock from Spinoza, whereas Spinoza would say that the rock’s
negation strictly falls outside of the rock’s being, Hegel would say that this could only be true in a
derivative sense. The primary meaning of negation is not the negation something has in what is beyond
its being; the primary meaning of negation is the negation that something’s own being is. At the level of
abstraction we are at, Hegel can only say that the rock is there and has a qualitative existence. This
qualitative existence would include things like its being in space, its color, density, and the like. Each
of these can only be what it is while also not being what it is not. For the rock to be here in space, it
must not be there; for it to have this color, it must not have that one. Hegel’s account shows that the
proper way to interpret this is, initially, to say that spatial position, color, and the like have a negative
dimension just as much as a positive one. They all have a given determinate content distinct from
other given contents: colors, positions, and so on need to be viewed as various combinations of
‘affirmations and negations’ (ises and is-nots). Those combinations have an immediate being as
qualities which themselves are forms of nonbeing just as much as they are of being. This spatial region
where the rock exists is equally a nonbeing (of all other spatial regions, for example) as it is positively
this region itself. To put it concisely, Hegel’s rock has negation within its own being, but Spinoza’s
rock has its negation only in what is external to it.
This contrast between Hegel and Spinoza has further consequences downstream in the Ethics
and the Logic which create further differences between the two philosophers. Hegel’s view of negation
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allows him to develop a notion of negation of negation or self-negation which Melamed, for example,
thinks is the source of most of the differences between Hegel and Spinoza.44 In my view, however,
the category of being-there is sufficient for making all the points Hegel does, and I suppose I will put
this on display in the final chapters of this study.45
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Chapter 3. From Negation to Being
Spinoza’s understanding of being and nothing will be crucial for the problem of finitude and
the threat of acosmism in the last two chapters, and it has already surfaced in our discussion of his
views on negation, which served to introduce these issues and will later serve to help translate between
Hegel’s discussions of Spinoza (which usually frame things in terms of negation) and my own. But
part of Hegel’s interpretation of Spinoza is the claim that Spinoza has an Eleatic understanding of
being, an understanding of being which maintains a strict separation of being and nonbeing, which we
have already seen, but also maintains that the introduction of nonbeing into ontology involves an
error. We could defend acosmism, as Friedrich Jacobi did around Hegel’s own time, using such an
understanding of being: anything finite must ‘not be’ to some extent, a limitation in virtue of which it
can be finite at all, and so finite things are “non-entia”, nonbeings which do not and indeed cannot
exist,46 since nonbeing is not and is never united with being. A misunderstanding of Spinoza’s views
on being like this one, therefore, could be crucial to making the judgment that he is an acosmist.
However, I will argue against Hegel’s ‘Eleatic’ interpretation of Spinoza on being because
Spinoza would reject the error claim essential to the Eleatic understanding of being. For Spinoza,
nonbeing and negation are not by nature erroneous or false concepts when applied to reality; they are
‘beings of reason’, thoughts or concepts which adequately explain relations among real beings but
which are not themselves directly reflected in reality. The threat of acosmism becomes the threat that
Spinoza cannot provide a positive ground in real being for negation and nonbeing, and the challenge to
find such a ground frames Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Hegel’s acosmist reading, then, will only be
successful if it locates a reason to think finding such a ground is impossible given Spinoza’s principles.
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In Chapter 4, I show where such a reason emerges; in Chapter 5, I argue that Hegel identified it
correctly as well.

Spinoza & the Eleatics on Being
In Chapter 2, we saw that the fundamental break between Spinoza and Hegel lies in the
moment that the transition from becoming to being-there is made, the moment at which the strict
separation of being and nonbeing is eradicated. Spinoza can follow Hegel all the way to becoming,
but the unification of being and nothing in being-there is strictly forbidden in Spinoza’s thinking.
The earliest and most explicit insistence on the strict separation of being and nonbeing in the
history of philosophy is undoubtedly Parmenides, the main figure in the Eleatic School. For that
reason, it is unsurprising that Hegel often repeats the claim that Spinoza has an Eleatic understanding
of being in line with Parmenides.47 For Parmenides, being is, and nonbeing is not; being never is not,
and nonbeing never is. This much agrees with Spinoza and the separation of being and nothing in
general. However, Parmenides adds a crucial element: “I shall not let thee say nor think that it came
from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that what is not is.”48 Thinking nothing is not thinking
anything, not even a real thought. Whenever nonbeing, a ‘not’, or a negation is involved in your
thinking, you are acting like you are thinking about some content, but in truth there is nothing to be
had there: a void which is only so long as it is available as being (not nothing). No idea involving
nothingness can be adequate because every such idea involves this constitutive error, and Hegel clearly
understands this about the Eleatic understanding of being: in the History of Philosophy, he says of
Parmenides that “[h]olding nothing for something true is the ‘way of error’ … the error is to conflate
[being and nothing], to give them the same worth.”49 The Eleatic understanding of being holds that
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thinking of any nothingness at all involves this erroneous conflation with being. Adequate, true
thinking extirpates the whole category of nothing.
The result is that the Eleatics came to reject any kind of change or diversity: any instance where
it is possible to say one thing ‘is not’, or where it ‘is not’ something else. These things have to be
interpreted as ‘semblances’ which seem to be but which, we know rationally, do not really exist. As far
as ultimate reality is concerned, they became, in Hegel’s language, acosmists, denying finite things with
change, multiplicity, and difference. Hegel explicitly endorses an interpretation of Spinoza which
maintains this Eleatic conclusion:
Parmenides has to make do with semblance and opinion [to discuss anything determinate in
his cosmology], the opposite of being and truth: likewise in Spinoza, with attributes, modes, extension,
movement, understanding, will, and the rest.50
Anything involving any differentiation and determinacy whatsoever is mere semblance and opinion,
opposed to truth. But is Hegel correct about this? Karolina Hübner argues Hegel’s interpretation of
Spinoza on finitude and negation misses Spinoza’s distinction between “ideality” (‘beings of reason’)
and “illusion or error”.51 I will defend a version of her thesis, arguing negation and nothing are beings
of reason.52 Against Hegel, this means that nonbeing has a legitimate place in ontology, even though
there is no real negativity in reality itself for Spinoza.
In his early Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza explicitly and rigorously defines various forms of
being. The second of the two relevant definitions here makes clear that Spinoza does not have an
Eleatic understanding of being. The relevant definitions are these:
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(1) Real being, or being as such, is “all that which, when clearly and distinctly perceived, we find to
exist necessarily or at least possibly.”53
(2) A being of reason is “nothing but a mode of thinking which serves to more easily retain, explain,
and imagine things that are understood.”54
Real beings are forms of being that exist in the world, but beings of reason are ideas whose content
does not exist in the world but only exists as an idea that serves us in thinking about the world. Spinoza
adds the important qualification that these beings of reason can have multiple sources, including the
intellect. This is hardly surprising, since they serve to retain, explain, and imagine things that are
understood, that is, not ones that are misunderstood.
What are examples of beings of reason? Here is one account he gives. Real beings often share
features or characteristics in common, and we can discover or derive things about beings that have
this or that characteristic. We provide the characteristic with a name, like ‘red’, and then proceed to
label beings which have the characteristic by this name. This helps facilitate retention of whatever we
already understand about these characteristics as they were found in another thing. We thus come to
think in terms of groupings or universals, such as “genus, species, etc.” which Spinoza regards as
beings of reason.55 Universals are not terms that are actually ‘out there’; they are terms we introduce
to explain relationships amongst what is ‘out there’. All beings of reason have this in common: they
take real beings, relate them, and then express these relations in categories of their own. Our
conceptions of beings of reason are not ideas of real beings themselves but terms introduced ‘in
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between’ real beings. Beings of reason cannot, then, ever themselves be real beings. Spinoza’s other
examples of categories of this sort include numbers, privations, and negations.
In effect, understanding that negation and, with it, nonbeing are beings of reasons will mean
understanding, first, why they are not real beings and, second, why they are nevertheless helpful in
thinking about real being. This first requirement means that we must get a clearer understanding of
what exactly real being is, and the main text of the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy will be particularly
helpful for this aim. There, Spinoza reconstructs three of Descartes’s arguments for God’s existence.
The third argues that the facts that we exist and that we have an idea of God imply that God exists.
But Spinoza finds the axioms on which Descartes’s proof depends unsatisfactory and ambiguous. 56
So, he intervenes and provides replacements of his own. One of these, stating a being is more or less
perfect (or real) to the extent that it is more or less necessary, is what we are interested in.57
Existence is contained in the idea or concept of everything (P1A6). … Because we cannot affirm
any existence of nothing (see P1P4s), in proportion as we in thought subtract from its perfection
and therefore conceive it as participating more and more in nothing, to that extent we also negate the
possibility of its existence. So, if we conceive its degrees of perfection to be reduced indefinitely to
naught or zero, it will contain no existence, or absolutely impossible existence. But, on the
other hand, if we increase its degrees of perfection indefinitely, we shall conceive it as involving
the utmost existence, and therefore most necessary existence.58
Spinoza here understands necessity and possibility in terms of increases and decreases of real being.
The more being something lacks (the more we “subtract from its perfection”), the more real being
there is which is not immanent to the being of the thing at hand. We see, implicitly at least,
transcendent negation reemerge in the way Spinoza uses “to negate” and we see its underlying
principle, the separation of being and nothing, reaffirmed explicitly. The more reality something lacks,
the more we “negate” its possibility: we more and more affirm some real being beyond its being, that
P1P7s.
Note that, in the Principles as in the Ethics, Spinoza says that ‘perfection’ just means ‘reality’ or ‘being’. Further, to be
clear, Spinoza uses ‘existence’ in a broad sense, so that properties, modes, substances, etc. ‘exist’ and ‘are real’ if it is actually
true ‘that they are’, regardless of their precise ontological or categorial status.
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is, we more and more understand that it is possible for something else to exist and not it. Conversely, the
more real being there is in something, the less it is possible to negate its existence by providing some
alternative possibility, eventually making it completely necessary when no reality is lacking. In this
sense, beings are more or less necessary to the extent they approximate absolute necessity, which lacks
no perfection and so cannot be negated or denied.59
Now the difficulty of expressing how determinate perfections relate to real being correctly is
significant. Real being is not a genus or species. Spinoza not only rejects that these have any real being,
but real being is the ‘is’ presupposed in every determinate kind of being or single being. The being we
would be trying to define would already be given, and the specifications of type, entity, and the like
would simply add extra onto being, which is what we are trying to define. In the same way, because
of this priority of being, being cannot be thought of as an aggregate or collection, since any specified
members of the collection would already immanently presuppose what the collection supposedly is:
real being. Yet, no single being can be beyond real being because any ‘existence’ it could have already
is real being. Because real being is simultaneously prior to yet inclusive of the being of any specific
thing or determination, everything which can be (every possible perfection) is enfolded or contained
within real being, but not as already defined. I take it that this is why Spinoza uses existence, not essence,
(i.e., ‘that-it-is’, not ‘what-it-is’) to define real being, along with an indefinite “all that” (omne).60 Real
being can be conceived, then, as an ontological category of possible existence, that-ness, immediacy,
which would belong to anything whatsoever if it were to and could exist. In this respect, Spinoza
connects nicely to Hegel’s beginning with being, pure and simple, as immediacy.

‘To negate’ and ‘to deny’ are the same word in Latin: negare.
I do not make too much of the “necessarily or at least possibly” in the definition of real being. I take the mention of
necessity in addition to possibility to foreshadow Spinoza’s necessitarianism, instead of indicating that he means to rule
out contingent possibilities by definition. It is just that, for Spinoza, a ‘contingent possibility’ is a contradiction. See, for
example, E1P29.
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Spinoza’s intervention on modality gives us not only a launching point to understand real
being by its relation to determinate perfections, but it also gives us a path to coming to understand his
views on nonbeing or nothing, which will be crucial to see whether he has an Eleatic understanding
of being or not. With the reappearance of negations in possibility, we can understand finite being as
being whose reality is somehow enfolded within absolutely infinite and necessary existence, real being
which cannot but be present in whatever exists. The finite has some negation in the perfections
enfolded within being, while the infinite would be being which has no transcendent negation. This
notion of negation that distinguishes possibility from necessity, of course, fits nicely with our own
discussion of negation in the previous chapter, where I showed how a transcendent negation is not
necessarily actual but could also just be possible. But the last chapter also showed that negation is a
launching point for a deeper investigation into Spinoza’s understanding of being and nonbeing; let us
use what we have learned about real being to see if we cannot figure out what Spinoza’s precise views
on nonbeing are, beyond what we saw in Chapter 2. The conclusion of that investigation will reveal
that Spinoza does not, in fact, have an Eleatic understanding of being.

Nonbeing as a Being of Reason
What is at stake, then, is whether Spinoza gives us a reason to think that nonbeing, negation,
and nothing have sufficient rational credentials to be used in ontology, that is, that they can be used
to study real being without making an error. Once again, Spinoza’s views on negation will turn out to
be quite helpful in figuring out what his underlying or coincident view of nonbeing is.
Later in the text, Spinoza equates “finite and imperfect” with “participating in nothing”, 61 a
phrase he uses in the passage we have been analyzing on modality. To understand what he means by
nothing here, let us take two of Spinoza’s comments elsewhere as our clues. Arguing against the phrase
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creatio ex nihilo (‘creation from nothing’), he says, “there is no doubt that they have not considered
‘nothing’ as the negation of all reality but have imagined or pictured it as something real.”62 The implication
is that the true way of conceiving nothing is as the negation of all reality, that is, of being as such, and
this is an alternative to the erroneous way of conceiving it that conflates of being and nonbeing.
Consequently, Spinoza explicitly rejects the notion essential to the Eleatic understanding of being: he
rejects the idea that we necessarily make the error of treating nothing as being if we think of it at all,
the idea that being by nature gets tangled up in this error.
So, if we are not just supposed to dismiss nothing, what are we supposed to do with it? Are
we then supposed to consider being (reality, real being) and nothing as related by a negation? No,
“there is no relationship between something and nothing.”63 Nothing is the negation of all being as such,
and so it must be a concept whose conceptual content (if it has any) is entirely external to whatever
content is characterized by being or is included or contained in the concept of being. Attempting to
relate the two would be attempting to make a relatum of the absence of any relatum (nothing, nonbeing);
the two have no relation. Being is simply this, nothing that, and there ‘is’ nothing in either or both
which relates them to one another, except insofar as we have positive ideas of being and nothing that
we can reflect upon.
Spinoza nicely reproduces Hegel’s idea of an immediate distinction between being and nothing
here: this and that category, each entirely external to the other without any mediation or relation that
binds them. Spinoza approaches Hegel even closer; he defends the principle ex nihilo nihil fit in
Cartesian terms in the Principles. He argues the rejection of ex nihilo nihil fit would allow us to think
‘being’ united with ‘nothing’, which would imply that I could think the self-evident ‘I am’ as an ‘I am

62
63

CM2C10. (Italics added.)
P1P7s.

34
not’.64 My being would logically pass over into nothing, perhaps awaiting its unification in being-there.
But Spinoza rejects this the moment ‘I am not’ contradicts ‘I am’.
Nothing, then, is no less than the idea of that which is external to real being. As such, whenever
a being lacks a perfection, we can say it “participates more and more in nothing” in the same way as
we say that things have increases in reality. It contains more imperfections, lacks of reality, all of which
are contained in nothing. But this whole concept of a ‘lack of reality’ is based on, first, one real being
which has some positive reality, for which there is some other possible real being which contains an
alternative reality not contained in the first. In their relation to one another, we can see that the second
‘lacks’ some reality the first has, and this notion of a ‘lack’ (i.e., ‘negation’) is introduced by us as a
rational construct that allows us to explain relationships between real beings. When negation is taken
in its general form, not as the negation of some determinate reality but as the negation of being as
such, it is nothing: nothing is that which falls outside of real being, that which lacks real being. Since
negation is regarded as a being of reason by Spinoza, there is no prima facie reason why ‘nothing’ (as
the negation of being as such, rather than some determinate reality) would not be also. Inasmuch as
this idea of nothing might be helpful in explaining negation, conducting proofs, or rephrasing results,
nothing too must be a being of reason.
Spinoza does clearly think these concepts are useful. Just in the Principles, Spinoza heavily uses
the concept of nothing in ex nihilo nihil fit to defend the principle of sufficient reason.65 Beyond the
uses of negation I have already mentioned, Spinoza also seems to use his ontological concept of
negation in the Ethics to ground the ‘will’, as the faculty of affirming or denying (negating).66 He seems
to do the same when discussing passive affects.67 Negation and concepts derivative from it (like
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‘destruction’ and ‘determinate’) feature prominently in the cluster of propositions that prove the
‘conatus’.68 Throughout the Ethics and Spinoza’s work in general, negation and nothing are used to
facilitate our quest for adequate ideas and true knowledge. Negation and nothing, then, must not inherently
involve falsity, inadequacy, or error. They are beings of reason with rational credentials, so long as they are
not treated as real beings themselves.
Against Hegel, therefore, I think we must maintain that Spinoza does not have an Eleatic
understanding of being. He not only rejects the supposed ‘error’ essential to this understanding of
being, he does not even accept that nonbeing’s introduction to ontology is erroneous at all. Negation
clearly captures a relation between real beings: namely, the relation of ‘lacking’ discussed just a moment
ago. Nothing is a natural generalization that this relation suggests, and it too (more indirectly) can be
used to speak of relations in real being.
The challenge that maintaining negation and nonbeing are beings of reason presents, which
will lurk throughout Chapter 4, is this: negation and nothing can appear only in relations within real being.
Real being must, therefore, somehow ground any nonbeing that can legitimately appear in ontology.
Since a ‘partial negation’ defines finitude, this means that the very possibility of any finite being will
depend on grounding this partial negation in positive being. That issue, we will see, generates a
veritable ‘problem of finitude’ when we introduce Spinoza’s monism. Ultimately, there are not
multiple real beings which we can relate to one another straightaway. Multiplicity, difference, and so
forth must somehow be grounded in a unified substantial being which is prior to and contains them.
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Chapter 4. The Problem of Finitude
I take it that the fact that Spinoza must somehow ground these appearances of nonbeing in a
purely positive being, real being strictly separated from nonbeing, is at the heart of Hegel’s ‘acosmist’
reading of Spinoza, that is, his reading according to which Spinoza denies (or must deny) the existence
of finite things. Spinoza would be an ‘acosmist’ in the sense that the cosmos, the world of finite things
with limits and differences, would not exist.
Acosmism only comes to the surface, however, after Spinoza’s monism is in place: in the wake
of a uniform, positive substantial reality that underlies all things, it becomes quite difficult to see how
any sort of transcendence could be established for negation. How can we go from a uniform this to which
all things are immanent to a myriad realm of thises and thats which transcend one another, having reality
external to one another?
There are three basic components to Spinoza’s monism which make the question of acosmism
so problematic. First, Spinoza argues that substance necessarily exists, so that its incompatibility with
finite things would make finite things impossible. Second, substance has an absolutely infinite reality
which contains the reality of finite things as “certain and determinate” modifications of its own being.
Third, substance is prior to these finite things, so that finite beings cannot be introduced before or in
conjunction with substance; Spinoza must show how substance can ground their introduction into
ontology. I will call these three components the necessity element, the containment element, and the priority
element of Spinoza’s substance ontology respectively. I will argue these three elements, when combined
with Spinoza’s monism and views on being, create the problem of finitude.
So, in this chapter, I reconstruct Spinoza’s substance ontology with an eye to each of these
elements to show how it gives rise to what I call ‘the problem of finitude’ in the Spinozist system. I
introduce the Spinozist ontological framework of substance, attributes, and modes, which is essential
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to grasping the containment element. Using this framework, Spinoza’s proofs proceed in three distinct
stages, each of which represents a major development in ‘substance’ within the Ethics. The ontological
landscape Spinoza sets out at the Ethics’ beginning establishes the priority element and introduces the
containment element. After that, Spinoza first proves substance must exist, establishing the necessity
element in the process. Then, he proves that substance exists as God, an absolutely infinite being.
Finally, he proves God is nature, as everything is immanent to substantial being. These last two steps
complete the containment element, and with their completion Spinoza’s substance monism is in place.
When combined with Spinoza’s insistence that positive being cannot be united with nonbeing,
Spinoza’s monism creates the problem of finitude. The problem of finitude is that, although Spinoza
everywhere seems to accept that finite things exist, his metaphysics nevertheless also seems to entail
that finite things are not even possible, let alone that they do not exist. This problem is the source, I take
it, of Hegel’s charge that Spinoza failed to demonstrate the transition from God to finite being, to
being with negation.69 In essence, it seems that Spinoza must accept that the being of substance insofar
as present in a finite mode must transcend itself or negate itself in virtue of what limits it. Yet, this
would mean that substance’s being must simultaneously be itself and its own nonbeing, a Hegelian
notion of being-there we already saw that Spinoza rejects. We are forced to confront not the question
‘If finite things exist, how do they relate to God?’ but ‘How could finite things possibly exist at all?’70
It seems that Spinoza’s rejection of being-there rules out a positive answer to the latter. In this chapter,
I only present the problem, inspired by Hegel’s philosophy and remarks about Spinoza. In Chapter 5,
I argue Hegel successfully identifies this problem, provide Spinoza’s answer, and defend Hegel’s
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critical acosmist reading by arguing that Spinoza’s solution can only successfully solve the problem of
finitude insofar as Spinoza abandons his own rejection of being-there.

Spinoza’s Substance Ontology
The Short Treatise gives us an intermediate link to move from Spinoza’s views on being to his
later substance ontology; in that book, he defines God as a being of which all possible attributes are
predicated in their infinitely perfect form (very similar to E1D6). Then, he motivates the definition by
linking it to the traditional ‘most perfect being’ definition:
The reason is this: since nothing can have no attributes, the all must have all attributes; …
[likewise,] something has attributes because it is something. Hence, it is more something the
more attributes it must have, and consequently God, being the most perfect, … must also
have infinite, perfect, and all attributes.71
The reasoning here echoes his earlier intervention on modality; something is ‘more real’ the more
possible perfections of being are in its being. God’s modality seems to correspond to infinite being
which had, as we saw, absolute necessity: there are no limits, no alternatives, to God’s being available
within real being. So, one might read the beginning of the Ethics as the demonstration that real being
cannot be just being qua being but must be the being of God. The Ethics does not, then, begin with
God; as Deleuze puts it, the Ethics aims “to elevate itself as quickly as possible to the idea of God,
without falling into an infinite regress, without making God a remote cause.”72 In making that ascent,
Spinoza proves his own famous ‘trinitarian’ God: substance = God = nature.
The opening definitions of the Ethics set out the ontological landscape for this proof. That
landscape is carved by three central concepts: substance, attribute, mode. Their definitions are these:
D3: By substance, I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that
whose concept does not require the concept of another, from which it must be formed.
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D4: By attribute, I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its
essence.
D5: By mode, I understand the affections [or states] of a substance, or that which is in another
through which it is also conceived.73
A complete discussion of these definitions would take us too far afield. But I think the alternative
formulation in E1D3 provides us with the understanding we need for our discussion. Substances are
those beings whose essence, whose concept, is possible without introducing or presupposing an
essence or concept from which they are formed. Conversely, modes are not possible without
introducing or presupposing an essence or concept from which they are formed. The ontology
Spinoza is providing is consequently going to be exhaustive; it divides being along a tautological
disjunction (‘possible without…’ or ‘not possible without…’). The most difficult definition to grasp,
in my view, is that of the attributes, and yet understanding the attributes is crucial to understanding
the containment element of Spinoza’s monism: why is the being of finite things (finite modes)
somehow contained in or drawn from the being of substance?
“Attributes”, I take it, are descendants of Cartesian “principal properties”. Descartes says that
there is “one principal property of every substance, which constitutes its nature or essence, and upon which all
others [(properties of that substance)] depend.”74 Principal properties are those in terms of which all
further properties of that substance are formulated and on which they are therefore dependent. In
Spinoza, two attributes are discussed at length: thought and extension. If we follow Descartes, the
idea behind these two attributes is that there is no property, definition, or the like of, say, a corporeal
body which does not already include, directly or indirectly, ‘being extended’. Spinoza explains a body’s
‘extension’ in exactly this way in the Principles by saying bodies are subjects of extension whose further
properties ‘presuppose’ extension.75 The subject of predication is only possible granting extension,
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and all its predicates (motion, volume, mass, etc.) all either explicitly include extension in their
definitions or are only physically meaningful if we assume extension, in terms of which their contents
are formulated (‘from which they are formed’, to echo E1D3). ‘Thought’ has the same function as
extension for ideas, minds, emotions, and the like in the realm of the mental. So, attributes are those
essences in terms of which all further properties of a substance are defined.
Aside from the similarity of their definitions, one might object that this interpretation of
attributes is specious insofar as Spinoza omits the second part of Descartes’s definition, and it is not
obvious why Spinoza would try to capture this idea by referring to the “essence of substance”. Even
so, I think Deleuze gives us the resources for answering this objection. Deleuze argues that one of
Spinoza’s central criticisms of traditional theology is that it defines God by propria,76 properties which
God necessarily possesses but which do not define the essence of a real being (a possible ‘what-it-is’);
it defines a being by things which must be true of it but fails to ever tell us what a being with those
properties would be. I think that Spinoza’s reason for defining the attribute in terms of substance is
much the same here. The attribute necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Cartesian principal
property, but Spinoza does not want to define an essence in terms of its properties. Descartes explicitly
does this when he defines principal properties as those on which all further properties of a substance
depend. The essence of the real being defined is stated as if its properties, which are supposed to be
posterior to that being (its states, relations, etc. dependent on it), could somehow be given prior to the
being on which they depend.
To avoid this impossibility, Spinoza goes straight to essences of real beings alone,
distinguishing ‘what can be’ only as formed from something else and ‘what can be’ independently of
any other reality. The essence of any mode is formed from the essence of substance (the attribute);
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they are formulated in terms of it and what it contains. In this sense, all further properties (modes,
inherent in the substance’s essence) depend on the attribute constituting the substance’s essence. This
is, of course, precisely the function of Cartesian principal properties, introduced without defining what
is prior with what is posterior.
Once we see this is what Spinoza is doing, we already see that the priority element of his
ontology is established, and the containment element has been introduced. Substance’s being contains
the being of modes insofar as modes are simply different ways of contorting substance’s being to
obtain some reality formed out of it and which is nothing beyond it, that is, some reality immanent to
it and contained in it. The rigorous dependence of modes’ being on substance’s (or the attribute’s) here
also explains why the latter must be prior to the former, so that I can never introduce a mode at an
earlier or identical logical order as I introduce substance (or an attribute).
We can now ask the following question: how would a substance exist?77 One need only think
about the definition of substance: to be what it is, the essence of substance does not require any other
essences (existing or not) which would go into forming it. That is, it is possible for substance to exist
without any other essence.78 Spinoza accepts the principle of sufficient reason,79 and so we must ask,
‘In the possible case that substance does exist, why does it exist?’ The cause cannot be anything other
than substance, since we supposed that it can exist as what it is without anything else. In this possibility,
substance can only exist simply because of itself. So, substance is, as Spinoza says, the cause of itself.80
Since this argument did not depend on any particular kind of substance, we may conclude that
substances necessarily exist. We thus have the necessity element of Spinoza’s ontology.
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The necessity element of Spinoza’s ontology only becomes problematic once we see that it is
not just the necessity that some possible substance exists, all possible substances exist, or the like. Its
problematic character emerges when we see that the substance which exists is necessarily also the only
substance which can exist. Which substance, so it will turn out, is the only possible one? It is God,
Spinoza answers. God is defined as “an absolutely infinite being, that is, a substance consisting of an
infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.”81 God is a being
which is not limited, lacks no perfection of real being.
Though there are other proofs that God alone is possible in the Ethics, I will reconstruct the
one in E1P7s2, which I find the most convincing one that is relatively easy to isolate from the rest of
the text. Spinoza observes that the essence of a thing does not define a certain number of individuals
but just defines what it is to be a certain kind of individual. So, a definition of ‘triangle’ does not define,
say, 20 triangles existing in nature. If it did, we would still be able to ask how many ‘twenties of
triangles’ there are in nature. No, a definition only expresses an essence which is indifferent to its
number of realizations. So, if a certain number of individuals of a given nature exists, then there must be
a cause for their existence external to their essence. But there can be no such external cause for substance,
since it by nature exists and so must already exist prior to its being caused to exist, which is impossible.
Therefore, if I suppose two substances existing of the same attribute, there would have to be a cause
for why these two exist and not more or less. But this cannot be so; “the existence of a number of
substances cannot follow”82 from its definition any more than the 20 triangles can follow from the
definition of a triangle. Thus, no substance of a certain attribute is numerically determinable at all; as
Spinoza himself admits, we only improperly call a substance ‘one’.83
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Hence, it is impossible for there to be two substances of any attribute. But God has all possible
attributes, that is, God’s essence has no negation in a possible attribute beyond it. What warrants our
assumption that it is even consistent to attribute all possible attributes to substance? Attributes are
completely conceptually independent; each is formulated on its own, independently and separately
from any other attribute. Everything that does or can pertain to an attribute must be formulated in
terms of that original, isolated reality. So, nothing could be derived from one which would even be
formulated in the same terms as anything derived from the other. There is, then, no possibility of a
contradiction between the attributes. God is just as possible as any possible attribute.
But God’s possibility implies all other substances must be impossible, since there cannot be
two substances of the same attribute. God not only exists because God is a substance, but God is the
only substance which can exist. Substance is God. Correlatively, every possible attribute exists, attributed
to God. The two we know of, as I said before, are thought and extension. So, what is the result?
“Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be nor be conceived without God.”84 Everything that exists is either in
God as in another (a mode) or is in God as in itself (substance). God is nature. This completes the
containment element of Spinoza’s metaphysics; every finite thing must be a mode of God, and thus
(as we saw when discussing the attribute) immanent to God and contained in divine being.

The Problem of Finitude
Stated in terms of the three elements of Spinoza’s metaphysics I have pointed out, the problem
of finitude could be stated quite concisely. The necessity element, when combined with monism,
guarantees that the only possible way to ground negation, finitude, and nonbeing is by doing so using
substance’s being. The priority element forces us to find this ground in substance prior to the
introduction of finite modes, and the containment element tells us that, once we have finite modes (if
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we can get them), they must remain immanent to substantial being. The central issue is this, then: the
only way for negation to obtain between modes is for transcendence to obtain within God’s own
being, that is, for God’s being as modified by these finite things which it contains to be immediately itself in
both modes and yet also not to be itself insofar as each mode stands apart from the other. This form of being
which simultaneously is and is not, however, is being-there, a concept Spinoza rejects in maintaining
a strict separation of being and nonbeing. Since Spinoza rejects being-there, the only way to avoid
contradiction would be to deny that finite things exist.
I take it that this is what Hegel means when he argues that Spinoza provides no “proof” of
the transition from the infinite into the finite.85 What ought to be shown is how finitude could follow
from God’s absolute infinity; yet, in Hegel’s view, Spinoza only ever begins by assuming finite things
and collapsing them into infinite substance. I will examine Hegel’s reading more closely in the next
chapter. For now, I would like to show that the problem of finitude is not just an issue that is externally
introduced by reflecting on the elements of Spinoza’s ontology in the way we have been doing. Instead,
the problem of finitude also emerges internally in Spinoza’s Ethics.
The difficulties for the possibility of finitude stem most directly from E1P21 and E1P22.
Together, these propositions state, first, that God cannot directly produce finite modes and, second,
that infinite modes cannot directly produce finite modes. The result seems to be that God produces
infinite modes, which can only produce infinite modes, which can only produce infinite modes, and
so on indefinitely. Since God, as the being on which everything depends for its essence and existence,
is the cause of all things in this way, it seems that God can produce only infinite things immediately
and more infinite things by some process of mediation.
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Looking at these propositions in detail will reveal not only where the problem of finitude is
most directly confronted by Spinoza, but it will also allow us to see in the next chapter what options
are available to Spinoza if he wants to solve the problem of finitude. Melamed reconstructs the
argument in E1P21 very nicely in his book Spinoza’s Metaphysics,86 though I will argue against an
interpretive intervention Melamed makes in his reconstruction. His argument follows Spinoza’s own
very closely (to the letter even), but here is his formulation. Suppose a mode 𝑚 necessarily follows
directly from some attribute 𝐴. Now, suppose that 𝑚 is finite. Then, 𝑚 can be limited by another
mode of the same nature (minimally, the same attribute). Call this other mode 𝑛. Now, elsewhere
Spinoza argues that whatever is possible through God’s nature must be actual, and so this possible
limitation is an actual limitation.87 That is, 𝑛 follows from 𝐴 and limits 𝑚. So, 𝑚 and 𝑛 both follow
from 𝐴. Spinoza infers from this that neither 𝑚 nor 𝑛 follow necessarily from 𝐴. Here, Melamed
offers an explanation which is the most (perhaps the only) contestable part of his reconstruction: he
infers that Spinoza uses a strong version of a ‘same cause, same effect’ principle here. Namely, 𝑚 and
𝑛 have precisely the same cause, and any difference in effects must be due to a difference in the cause.
But there is no difference in the cause. So, this contradicts the supposition that 𝑚 necessarily follows
directly from 𝐴. Hence, 𝑚 cannot be finite.
Replace 𝐴 in the proof above with ‘an infinite mode’ and you have E1P22. Melamed uses his
close reading of E1P21 to show that infinite modes are unique by order of derivation. If his version of
the proof is correct, then there can only be one infinite mode which follows from a given attribute,
then only one infinite mode which follows from that one, and so on indefinitely. To me, there seems
to be absolutely no way for finite modes to be produced in this setup. There would then only be a
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single chain of modes under each attribute following from God, and E1P21 and E1P22 guarantee that
every mode in this chain will be infinite.
Fortunately for Spinoza, I think that Spinoza would have rejected Melamed’s explanation of the
necessity claim in this proof, and so I will defend an alternative interpretation. Even if I accept that
causes and effects correspond strictly to one another, that does not imply that the cause produces only
one effect. The positive pole of a magnet simultaneously attracts a negative pole of one magnet and repels
the positive pole of another. A cause can be of such a nature as to produce multiple distinct effects,
and the cause’s essence does not have to differ to cause each effect. This is not merely my own view;
Spinoza explicitly accepts this. Spinoza’s contemporary Tschirnhaus observed that he could usually
only infer one property (presumably, the defining one) from mathematical definitions, and he asks
how Spinoza thinks many things can be derived from, for example, just the nature of extension.
Spinoza answers,
As to what you say in addition that from the definition of each thing considered in itself we
can deduce only one property, this may be true in the case of the very simple things, or in the case
of beings of reason (under which I also include figures), but not in the case of real beings.88
If some property (mode) follows from the definition of an existing thing (a real being), then some
essence exists because of the thing defined. This causation in mathematics is usually very restricted
due to the abstractness of the definitions involved. But in real beings, which are not abstracted down
to one or a couple essential traits, many effects of these sorts follow at once from a thing’s essence.
Multiplicity of effects alone, then, is not enough to give us the necessity claim. There must
therefore be something more contained in the assumption of the finitude of effects than there is
contained in the assumption of a multiplicity of effects, even though Melamed’s version of the argument
appealed only to the multiplicity of effects. What does finitude introduce that multiplicity does not?
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Our discussion of finitude makes this clear: negation. Just as a being can have a multiplicity of properties
all of whose being is one and the same, immediately united in the being of the thing which has those properties,
so too can this be true of infinite modes. The ‘being red’ and the ‘being solid’ in some rock, say, are,
to be sure, two distinct properties, but they are both inseparably united in the being of the rock. The
rock’s ‘this’, if you like, has both immanent to it. Thus, the transcendence of two kinds of reality gives us
more than multiplicity. Finitude introduces this transcendence, so that these two kinds of reality (the
two modes) are also external to one another, beyond one another.
This idea that the being of modes must be understood as immediately united through the
being of substance is not just introduced by me either. The same idea is found in Ep12, an early letter
which Spinoza continued to circulate throughout his life,89 where Spinoza distinguishes two kinds of
infinity and explains that the infinity of modes consists precisely in their unity with substance:
The question concerning the infinite has seemed most difficult, or rather insoluble, to all
because they did not distinguish between what must be infinite by its nature, or in virtue of its
definition, and what has no bounds [fines] not indeed in virtue of its essence but in virtue of its cause.90
The first kind of infinity belongs to substance, while the second kind is the infinity of modes. Spinoza
then explains that “we can, at will, determine the existence and duration of modes and conceive them
as greater or less, and divide them into parts, when … we are considering their essence alone and not
the order of nature.”91 Multiple distinguishable modes are only finite, only transcend one another, when
separated from the “order of nature”: the kind of immediate unity of multiplicity that I discussed in
the case of a rock just a moment ago. Here the containment element of Spinoza’s metaphysics
reemerges; modes of God must be grasped as states or modifications of all that God’s being contains,
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just as the rock’s ‘being red’ and ‘being solid’ are distinguishable states or modifications of its overall
reality. This multiplicity of infinite modes is initially united in substantial being without transcendence.
But we cannot stop there: Spinoza proves in E1P13 that substance is indivisible. The argument
for that claim is quite simple: suppose substance were divisible. Then, either the divided parts of
substance are substances or they are not. If they are still substances, then there would be multiple
substances, which is impossible. If they are not substances, then what would be left of substance’s
being after division would be no substance: just this part and that part. That is, substance would cease
to exist. But substance necessarily exists. Thus, substance is indivisible. The result is that we cannot divide
this or that aspect of what is contained in substance from the rest of substantial being. This is the more Spinozist
way of arriving at and phrasing the ‘immediate unity of multiplicity’. The “order of nature”, in part at
least, indicates this sense in which all things are united as one and the same being in substance.
According to their immanence to the order of nature, all things are infinite; their being is the being of
God. This is the point of E1P21: supposing the contrary, that something finite follows directly from
God or, per E1P22, from an infinite mode, is supposing that separation or transcendence obtains
within infinite being. If that were the case, one and the same being, this, would simultaneously be itself
and not be itself insofar as it transcends itself (would be that, not this). But this is precisely being-there: one
and the same immediacy is present, but once as the vanishedness of being, once as its original
affirmation. This distinction between the two, however, has collapsed in one immediacy. Because
Spinoza rejects being-there, this possibility is ruled out before E1P13 begins; dividing substance to
yield a nonsubstance cannot yield one and the same this which is also a that (a not-this). It must yield
separate beings, a this and a that, which destroy the underlying unity of substance.
Since we are dealing with finite beings contained in divine being, we can rephrase this in terms
of negation: to suppose that a mode that follows from God is finite is to suppose that God’s being, to some extent,
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negates God’s own being. Yet, in Spinoza, such a self-negating structure is forbidden. He can only get the
unity of the finite and infinite by referring the finite back to its cause and identifying its unity with
infinite being. But because, as we saw before, he is unwilling to unite nonbeing with being or allow
being to immanently require nonbeing, negation must begin and end as transcendent negation. No
self-negation can occur because negation can only emerge by external determination (the limiting term
beyond the being of the finite’s being), and there is nothing external to God.
So, returning to the reconstruction of the proof, God (or an infinite mode) cannot produce
both 𝑚 and 𝑛, and so whichever one is supposed to exist must exist contingently, somehow coming
into existence without God and with an alternative in its negation, in some other nonactual possibility.
Contradictions abound: we already saw everything which must (essential and existential) have its origin
in God. Beyond that, he argues everything that exists exists necessarily,92 and so this result would
contradict that fact alone, even if Spinoza had not stipulated it at the start of the proof.
The difference between these versions of the proof is subtle; it does not change anything
except the justification of the necessity claim in the proof. This difference, however, is crucial. There
are two elements to it which I consider the most important:
(1) On my interpretation, the basic idea of the problem of finitude is introduced directly into the
Ethics. That is, Spinoza explicitly recognizes that grounding finitude positively in infinite
substantial being is impossible given his other principles.
(2) On my interpretation (unlike Melamed’s), Spinoza is not committed to an ordered sequence of
unique infinite modes. All my reading requires is that infinite modes do not transcend one
another, inasmuch as they are all immediately united with substantial being.
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Both points carry over to E1P22; the only difference would be that the infinite being which cannot
serve as the positive ground of finitude is the being of a mode of God, rather than the being of God.
So, Spinoza notices the self-negation (which is problematic since it introduces being-there) in
bringing the finite out of the infinite; E1P21 and E1P22 depend on this realization, and together they
explicitly prohibit introducing finitude out of God’s being or out of the being of a mode produced by
God. It seems that little room is left for finitude.
The specter of acosmism, then, looms large. If I cannot say X is not Y, everything collapses
into an indeterminate mass of being. I could not say red is not green, inasmuch as this involves one’s
reality being external to the other; I could not say I am not you, or this table, or anything of the sort.
The cosmos requires separations like these. Negation may be a being of reason, but it still needs to be
grounded in real being. It seems, however, that we have reason to believe not just that Spinoza does
not provide this ground but that he cannot do so. A coherent Spinozism, then, would have to be
acosmism. Is this Hegel’s reading? Is it Spinoza’s view? I answer those questions in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5. Acosmism
In the previous chapter, I drew out the problem of finitude from a broadly Hegelian
perspective but not strictly by interpreting Hegel’s own explanation of his interpretation of Spinoza. I
will begin by showing how Hegel’s own acosmist reading identifies the crucial junctures in Spinoza’s
thinking that generate the threat of acosmism. I have found it best to place my own arguments and
interpretation before Hegel’s because Hegel does not go into much detail in defending or explaining
his interpretation, and so I think what exactly his interpretation and arguments mean and what their
merits are is most easily seen only after I have independently explained the problem and its origins.
Since Spinoza perceives the problem, it should not be surprising to learn that he does offer a
solution to it:
[C]ertain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely, those which follow
necessarily from his absolute nature, and others (which nevertheless can neither be nor be
conceived without God) had to be produced by the mediation of these first things.93
So, somehow finitude is produced not from God but by ‘mediate modes’ which serve as mediating
links between God and finite modes. But we have already seen that nothing finite can follow from
infinite modes. What exactly this mediation involves is not a straightforward thing to answer.
So, the second goal of this chapter is to provide an account of Spinoza’s proposed solution.
Given, from the last chapter, that there is a multiplicity of infinite modes which are immediately united,
I argue an ontology of contrariety accomplishes the kind of mediation required to obtain finite modes;
infinite modes have, within their positive being, a power to exclude what is incompatible with them,
and latent incompatibilities between infinite modes ground the possibility of finitude for Spinoza.
There thus comes to be a distinction of two realms of modes: one where modes are infinite with
implicit contrarieties with one another, excluding one another but not yet excluded, and one with finite
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modes produced by two or more infinite modes which have been excluded from one another. This
distinction is reflected in a less famous subdivision of “Natura naturata” in Spinoza’s famous distinction
between Natura naturata and Natura naturans. Natura naturata is distinguished into particular and universal
Natura naturata. The latter is produced being insofar as it is active, excluding, and infinite; the former
is produced being that has been made finite by implicit contrarieties in these infinite modes.
While Spinoza’s solution would solve the problem of finitude independently of his views about
being, it introduces finitude only by simultaneously violating his views on being. Since finite modes
produced by this mediating process are no less immediately united with God than infinite modes, their
being is still essentially ‘in’ and ‘formed from’ all that is contained in substantial being. The mediating
distance, then, removes the immediate threat, but since infinite modes’ being is immanent to, or
nothing that transcends, the being of God, they can separate from and negate one another only at the
cost of substance separating and negating itself. This introduces a unity of being and nonbeing that is
strictly prohibited in Spinoza’s thinking. So, I conclude, Spinoza’s solution to the problem of finitude
is not entirely successful; it avoids acosmism only by abandoning his views on being, bringing him
closer to Hegel, the philosopher of negativity rather than, as Deleuze said, one whose philosophy is a
“philosophy of pure affirmation”.

Hegel’s Acosmist Reading of Spinoza
On one level, Hegel’s acosmist reading serves more than just a critical-interpretive function;
Vittorio Hösle points out that it might have the more positive function of rescuing Spinoza from the
charge of atheism championed by Hegel’s contemporaries.94 Hegel introduces the term ‘acosmism’ in
his History of Philosophy while defending Spinoza against precisely this charge. He says, assuming
something exists, one can either deny the infinite and accept the finite (“atheism”), accept both
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(“amicable compromise”), or accept the infinite and deny the finite (“acosmism”). “The opposite of
what all those who accuse Spinoza of atheism say is true; in Spinoza, there is too much God.”95 Beyond
this, Hegel hardly mentions acosmism in his account of Spinoza in the History of Philosophy. His most
developed justification of his acosmist reading, then, is actually found in the Logic.
The first thing we established in making our way to the problem of finitude was that Spinoza
has a strictly transcendent view of negation, along with the strict separation of being and nonbeing it
encodes. Despite Hegel’s consistent and enthusiastic endorsement of omnis determinatio est negatio for
his own purposes and ideas, Stern has already pointed out that Hegel clearly distinguishes his own
understanding of this formula from Spinoza’s.96 Hegel says, “That determinacy is negation posited as
affirmative is Spinoza’s proposition: omnis determinatio est negatio, a proposition of infinite importance.
Only, negation as such is a formless abstraction [for Spinoza].”97 Spinoza was so close, if only he did not view
negation as such as a “formless abstraction”. We have already seen more in detail what Hegel could
mean by this: negation as such is an abstraction for Spinoza since it abstracts the logic of immanent
negation and being-there which the concept of negation presupposes. It is formless since a negation is
just whatever transcends the term negated; it does not matter what the ‘form’ its beyond takes, so long
as it just is some given reality beyond it.
In this same passage where he notes the difference between his own understanding of omnis
determinatio est negatio and Spinoza’s, Hegel provides a lengthy explanation of his acosmist reading,
which I will take part by part. First, he explains Spinoza’s monism:
The oneness of Spinoza’s substance, or that there is only one substance, is the necessary consequence
of this proposition that determinacy is negation. Spinoza had of necessity to posit thought and
being or extension … as one in this unity, for as determinate realities the two are negations
whose infinity is their unity; … since substance is the total void of internal determinacy, [the
Hegel, 20/163.
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attributes] are not even moments; the attributes, like modes, are distinctions made by an
external intellect [Verstand].98
Hegel’s idea is effectively this one: Spinoza’s concept of absolute infinity, an affirmation which has no
negation, implies the uniqueness of substance simply because any reality that is supposed to be external
to it cannot be, since any basic form of reality (attribute) or anything derived from it (mode) must be
enfolded into the absolutely infinite. So, Hegel claims, Spinoza accepts that there are all these diverse
possible attributes, which seem like they are distinct from one another, only to show that, because
absolute infinity can have nothing outside itself, these must be taken into one and the same being:
God. It turns out that the separation of the attributes is just one made by the intellect externally. They
are just multiple aspects of one and the same being, and they do not negate one another. All that is
mental (e.g., the mind) is physical (e.g., the body), and vice versa.
Now, I do not think that even an acosmist Spinoza must accept that the distinction of
attributes and infinite modes is made externally by the intellect. For Hegel, multiplicity is sufficient for
immediate distinction. After all, this term is this one, and that one is that one. We would be within our
rights, he would say, to apply the notion of immediate distinction here, and so the separation of these
two kinds of reality would have to be denied as mere semblance. Even if that is correct conceptually,
Spinoza must reject the claim that multiplicity entails immediate distinction because it very quickly
results in the introduction of being-there into ontology: think only of the ‘being red’ and the ‘being
solid’ of the rock. These two forms of being are distinct; their reality does not perfectly correspond to
one another. This one is this; that one is that. They contain different affirmations and negations. These
two realities are then immediately distinct, but they are immanent to one and the same immediacy in
the rock. Being and nonbeing are immediately united within it, which means this simple example of
something’s relation to its qualities would already imply being-there. Since Spinoza rejects being-there,
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he would have to reject this analysis. So, as an interpretation of him, Hegel is not right to suggest that
Spinoza must say that difference is introduced only by an external intellect in at least the cases of
attributes and infinite modes.
With finite modes, however, this is a different story, one closer to Hegel’s own explanation.
Finite modes, to be finite, depend on their negations’ transcendence over themselves; yet, when their
being is recognized as some modification of the being of substance, it suddenly is impossible for
anything to transcend them at all because that modification is immediately united with whatever
supposedly transcended it; they are not this and that, but moments of the very same this. So, Hegel
thinks, what Spinoza is doing is introducing each finite mode and then absorbing it into absolutely
infinite being because nothing can stand outside of it. Once the finite is absorbed into the infinite, it
vanishes precisely because the very transcendent negation that defines the finite becomes impossible
(unless we accept being-there so that infinite being can negate itself).
Now, that is Hegel parsed heavily in terms from this text and not his own. But if we can regard
my translation as a hypothesis, then that hypothesis receives nice confirmation in the second main
part of the passage at issue:
Also the substantiality of individuals cannot hold its own before that of substance. The
individual refers to itself by setting limits to every other. But these limits are therefore also
limits of itself; they are reference to the other. The individual’s being-there is not in the
individual. … [D]eterminacy asserts itself essentially as negation, dragging it into the same
negative movement of the understanding that makes everything vanish into the abstract unity
of substance.99
Hegel inverts the order of activity, making the finite limit its other rather than be limited by its other,
but the point is salvageable. The finite is finite only in having a negation beyond it; each individual
‘limits’ or ‘is limited’ by the other, and it cannot be finite without this reference.100 But precisely because
Ibid. (Italics added.)
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all reality is immanent to one and the same being, substantial being, there is no ground of this
transcendence in real being. While it seems that things negate one another and are finite, therefore,
this semblance is only a semblance. In truth, no reference to a transcendent other can be made.
Everything vanishes into the abstract unity of substance, the only real being.
The acosmist argument Hegel produces on Spinozist principles, I think we are warranted to
conclude, is much the same one that emerges in the problem of finitude: the immediate selfsameness
of substantial being comes into conflict with the transcendence of finite beings over one another. So,
I think we can credit Hegel with identifying the problem of finitude and noticing how, without
modifying Spinoza’s antecedent commitments at least, it precipitates into acosmism.

Spinoza’s (Hegelian) Restoration of the Cosmos
Spinoza, however, has an objection to be made against the claim that a coherent Spinozism is
acosmism. His reply depends on the difference between Melamed’s interpretation of E1P21 and my
own. Namely, on Melamed’s uniqueness reading, modes are unique by position in the causal sequence
by which they are produced. The result would be something like this:
𝑆 → 𝑀1 → 𝑀2 → ⋯ → 𝑀𝑛 → ⋯
Since each term is prior to the next, I think Spinoza would reject that any interaction which would
produce something new could happen between these modes.101 The first mode is infinite by E1P21,
and the rest are infinite by repeated application of E1P22. So, everything God produces is infinite.
But there is a way out. When we allow the multiplicity of modes at the same logical-causal
order, we can obtain sequences like this:

9. But this passage suggests that Hegel’s discussion of individuality has little to do with the criteria for individuation and
much to do with the way beings which can be individuated can exist apart from one another at all.
101 See, e.g., Spinoza, E1A3-4.
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𝑆→

𝑀11
𝑀12

→
→

𝑀21
→ 𝑀3
𝑀22

That is, the two propositions do not rule out that some kind of interaction between infinite modes
could produce a finite mode, which means the third mode in the sequence above could be finite. A
multiplicity of mediate infinite modes, then, is the only option Spinoza has left for introducing finite
things. Indeed, we can see that Hegel saw the issues at stake here even more sharply when we see that
he seems to have recognized this also:
For Spinoza, the infinite is not setting a limit and passing beyond it, sensuous infinity, but
rather it is absolute infinity, the positive which has an absolute multiplicity here present within itself.102
Spinoza has no difficulties introducing multiplicity. What he has difficulties introducing is negation
and realities that stand outside one another within that unified multiplicity: finitude, the cosmos. How
does Spinoza attempt to go from the united, positive multiplicity contained in substantial being to
finite beings which exist, in some respect, beyond or apart from one another?
This final section will be divided in two, answering this question and evaluating Spinoza’s
solution to it. To answer the first, I pick up on Spinoza’s discussion of contrariety in Part III of the
Ethics to argue that he has a little-discussed ontology of contrariety which serves as the kind of
interaction or relationship between infinite modes capable of mediately producing finite modes.103
Implicit incompatibilities contained in the positive being of distinct modes are capable of grounding
finite beings. Spinoza uses this logic of contrariety among infinite modes to ground finite being,
distinguishing two ‘faces’ of Natura naturata (produced nature): produced nature as infinite modes prior
to the action of contraries and produced nature as finite posterior to their interaction. In the second
part, I argue that nevertheless Spinoza’s solution implies that being-there is present in his ontology
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since the being of finite modes still remains immediately united to the being of substance. As a result,
his solution will turn out to be unsatisfactory insofar as it requires giving up key elements of his
thought, avoiding the problem of finitude but not answering it because of this evasion.

Spinoza’s Ontology of Contrariety
The interaction that infinite modes engage in here cannot just be any interaction. It must be
one that grounds a kind of exclusion of one’s being from another’s, introducing one’s transcendence
over the other. This exclusion must somehow not presuppose the negation at issue but, instead, must
originally produce it from within purely positive being. We would then want to suggest that perhaps
there is some power of exclusivity inherent in positive being, by which one infinite mode can, without
presupposing its negation or containing it immanently, exclude the being of other infinite modes
which it ‘can limit’. I will argue that an ontology of contrariety fills precisely this role. This ontology
of contrariety or opposition is introduced primarily in the three propositions which are used to prove
the conatus (E3P4-6), the principle by which each being, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere
in its being.
The first proposition introduces a prohibition of self-negation (negation understood in the
Spinozist sense) as the ontological bedrock of contrariety: “[n]o thing can be destroyed except through an
external cause.”104 This is “evident through itself”, Spinoza tells us, but he continues to provide an
explanation. He says that the definition of a thing affirms and does not negate the existence contained
in the essence defined. The nonexistence of the thing can never be contained in its own essence, and
therefore it must come from an external source: namely, an external cause of that nonexistence. It
seems to me that this is nothing but a reiteration of Spinoza’s view of negation. Something’s negation
always transcends it in the being of something else; insofar as it does not exist (in some place, time,
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other being, position in the causal order, etc.), that transcendent being is the reason for this (i.e., is the
cause). “Destruction” in this proposition thus simply means nonexistence that is contrasted with
existence. Notice that this argument does not assume that the ‘thing’ is finite.
The second proposition uses this foundation to introduce contrariety: “[t]hings are of a contrary
nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other.”105 Though this interpretation
has been disputed (most notably by Edwin Curley)106, I hold that Spinoza views the substance-mode
relation as a relation of inherence, but space prevents me from defending that view here.107 As a result,
this proposition will inform us about substance-mode inherence (i.e., a mode’s inherence in substance)
as much as mode-mode inherence (e.g., the inherence of a property in a body).
So, Spinoza defines contrariety as “being unable to inhere in the same subject”. When multiple
things inhere in the same subject, their existence is immediately united, integrated into the unified
existence of the subject in the same way as the rock’s color and shape in our previous example. If two
things were contrary and could still inhere in the same subject, therefore, the existence of that subject
would, in some respect, be capable of ‘destroying’ (negating), in some respect, the existence of the
subject. But by E3P4, this is impossible. E3P5 follows.
This introduces a way that a kind of separation can occur within what inheres in one and the
same being, to the extent that its contents “can destroy one another”. This is easiest to see in the case
of extension. An extended thing can ‘be extended in region X’ and ‘be extended in region Y’, where
X and Y are distinct, so long as it is not wholly extended entirely in those regions. We can, in effect,
divide up the extension that one reality contains and obtain several other distinct extended regions,
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each with being that transcends the other(s). My arms are immediately united with my entire body’s
being as this very body, as one and the same entity. But when considered on their own, they are realities
that stand outside one another; one is here, the other not here. Importantly, however, this did not
require us to grant negation or transcendence ahead of time: it only required us to grant the intrinsic
characteristics of positive beings, including each’s logic of contrariety.
Schematically put, on my interpretation, there are three steps in the ‘mediation’ mediate modes
accomplish. We have already seen the first two:
(1) First, there is a unified immediacy containing a multiplicity (without negation). For example,
the body with various extended parts, functions, and the like.
(2) Second, this primary reality produces possibilities of finite beings. That is, each term in this
multiplicity contains certain properties which are possibly contrary, though they are not already
contrary. For example, we saw that extended parts of the body can stand outside each other,
even though they are immediately united as long as we are considering the whole body.
But there is a third element of the structure which remains to be detailed:
(3) Third, these possibilities produced in (2) are actualized.
So far, contrariety is consigned to the realm of possibilities, not actuality, and so more can be done to
show that this is how actually existing finite modes could follow from God. Let us ask, therefore, how
does the third step occur?
E3P6 answers this by showing that this possibility is necessarily actual: “[e]ach thing, insofar as it
is in itself [quantum in se est], strives to persevere in its being.”108 Or, each thing has a conatus.109 In the first
E3P6.
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instance, this is just the result of the previous two propositions. Insofar as something is ‘in itself’ (i.e.,
has positive being of its own), it cannot negate or destroy itself but can only affirm itself. The only
thing Spinoza needs to add, as he does using E1P25c and E1P34, is that modes are necessarily affirmed
as a part of God’s active potency, by which everything possible is being actualized.
So, at the first level, the multiplicity of finite modes is such that those modes contain positively
within themselves a power by which they can exclude one another, and this makes possible, by
implication, a second order of possible modes which would be excluded, limited: finite modes. At this
second level, the potency of God further entails that they must exclude one another, so that these
possible finite things are actual finite things. That completes an account of the mechanics of the
“mediation” mediate modes are supposed to accomplish.

The Hiding Place of Being-there
Admittedly, using contrariety specifically as the kind of interaction that grounds finitude is the
most speculative part of my interpretation of Spinoza because Spinoza himself never makes this
connection, despite having recognized the problem. Nevertheless, the issue I will identify with his
solution has little to do with the specifics of how Spinoza tries to explain the mediation between finite
and infinite modes. I argue that the attempt to solve the problem of finitude by finding a ground for
negation in positive being is doomed to failure not because such a solution is impossible but because
it is only possible by introducing a notion of being-there. Spinoza seems to sidestep being-there by
introducing negation only in reference to modes’ being rather than substance’s, but I argue this only
pushes an implicit introduction of being-there into the background.
To my mind, the reasoning behind the problem of finitude is unavoidable, at least once the
key elements of the interpretation of Spinoza I have defended are accepted. After all, the problem
involves showing that certain elements of Spinoza’s philosophy, elements he has not challenged
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explicitly in answering the problem, lead to a contradiction or incoherence in his thinking about finite
things. It would thus be quite surprising if Spinoza were able to avoid this acosmist conclusion.
What is not surprising, however, is that he would attempt to ground finite being in substance
instead of just endorsing acosmism because, I think, he would agree with my reasoning in the
introduction that acosmism is a serious problem for the Ethics due to its structure and content. Unless
there were a misstep in our reasoning somewhere, which I do not think there is, we should expect
Spinoza’s solution to violate some of the presuppositions of Spinozist thinking somewhere, and this is
precisely what I think happens. But Spinoza is quite sophisticated in attempting to avoid this violation
of his own principles. Indeed, he shifts it into the background, creating a ‘hiding place’ for being-there
in his philosophy.
Whether we accept the details of my interpretation or not, Spinoza’s solution clearly attempts
to separate two ‘frames of reference’, as it were. There is the frame of infinite things, God and infinite
modes, and there is the frame of the unending causal chains of and connections between finite things:
two orders he calls universal and particular Natura naturata respectively in the Short Treatise,110 renewing
the distinction in the Ethics by arguing that the finite is always caused by another finite.111 On my
reading, this separation of the two frames happens in that finitude is made possible by infinite modes,
but it only becomes actual with numerous exclusive finite things acting on one another. This allows a
system of nature where things act externally on one another, produce one another, and the like, but
the two orders are not continuous. One is separated as a whole realm of possibilities produced by the
other, so that this new possibility can be actualized alongside (rather than within) the infinite modes,
avoiding a self-negation. On a less specific reading, one will have to at least recognize that Spinoza
does consistently treat the finite and infinite orders separately, and he tries to separate them by
110
111

Spinoza, ST/80.
E1P22 and E1P28 describe these distinct causal orders.
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avoiding a discussion of their direct connection with one another. They are separated by mediating
links which somehow bridge the infinite over here with the finite over there, in their own frames at a
distance from one another.
Despite the merits and, indeed, genius of Spinoza’s solution, a problem lingers. Although
Spinoza’s arguments do not use self-negation to defend his conclusions, his conclusions still imply beingthere and so tacitly presuppose the legitimacy of that concept. For this reason, although the separation
of these frames of reference pushes being-there into the background, being-there nevertheless remains
in the background, in the hiding place these frames of reference provide.
In what sense do his conclusions imply being-there? The containment element of Spinoza’s
ontology does not just apply to infinite modes but applies to all modes, finite modes included. For this
reason, finite modes are immediately united with substantial being just as much as infinite modes. As
a result, there is nothing underlying the problem of finitude which is not already at play here: the
problem of finitude has not been avoided. We are still left with substantial being, insofar as it is present
in the finite, being itself and not being itself, insofar as it is present in the finite’s negation. This
unification of being and nonbeing is, of course, being-there: the concept which emerged as the
breaking point between Hegel and Spinoza when we were working through the initial arguments of
the Science of Logic. While accepting being-there would let us avoid the problem of finitude entirely, the
problem only ever arose because Spinoza rejects being-there. Spinoza’s solution, then, as much of a
lesson in a “philosophy of pure affirmation” as it might be, cannot be regarded as a satisfactory
solution to the problem of finitude. It involves tacitly rejecting a principle that Spinoza accepts.
On an interpretive level, then, I think I would be in my rights to say that Hegel’s acosmist
reading of Spinoza does not follow even the letter of the text especially closely. His reading is allusive,
elliptical, and often terse. As a result, Hegel prefers to explain the relationship between the finite and
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infinite in terms of the concept of negation alone, foregoing a detailed analysis of Spinoza’s attempt
to bridge the finite and the infinite by providing a mediating role to infinite modes.112 He holds Spinoza
to his own principles and declares him an acosmist, but what he misses by passing over this part of
Spinoza’s text, surprisingly enough, is the moment that Spinoza becomes the most Hegelian: the
moment when he abandons that “formless abstraction” of negation, his supposedly “Eleatic”
understanding of being, and all the rest. What does he abandons them for? Nothing less than the
characteristically Hegelian concept of being-there. The problem of finitude suggested we would have
to embrace these concepts or accept acosmism: to approach Hegel or keep a distance from him.
Hegel’s reading maintains the distance by setting Spinoza in the second camp, but perhaps he would
have been even more satisfied to realize that, after all, Spinoza himself collapses the distance, for just
a moment, and becomes all the more Hegelian because of it.

112

See, e.g., 20/179, SL21.101, and EL§151a.
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